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Abstract—Market manipulation is a strategy used by traders to
alter the price of financial assets. One type of manipulation is
based on the process of buying or selling assets by using several
trading strategies, among them spoofing is a popular strategy
and is considered illegal by market regulators. Some promising
tools have been developed to detect manipulation, but cases can
still be found in the markets. In this paper we model spoofing
and pinging trading from a macroscopic perspective of profit
maximisation, two strategies that differ in the legal background
but share the same elemental concept of market manipulation.
We use a reinforcement learning framework within the full and
partial observability of Markov decision processes and analyse
the underlying behaviour of the manipulators by finding the
causes of what encourages the traders to perform fraudulent
activities. Procedures can be applied to counter the problem as
our model predicts the activity of the manipulators.
Index Terms—Asset price manipulation, spoofing, pinging, MDP,
generative model.
I. INTRODUCTION
Market microstructure is a branch of finance concerned with
the analysis of the trading process arising from the exchange of
assets under a given set of rules [1]. In double auction markets,
this exchange of assets occurs when the buy and sell sides
agree on the amount to pay/receive for the trade, depending
on the different trading strategies implemented by both sides;
the latter being a plan of actions designed to achieve profitable
returns by buying or selling financial assets [2].
While trading strategies are meant to follow the rules of
regualted markets, some traders misbehave by manipulating
the price of the assets being traded. For instance, some traders
use strategies like the pump and dump to spread false informa-
tion to other market participants that may affect the perceived
price [3]. Other traders follow strategies like ramping, wash
trading, quote stuffing, layering, and spoofing among others,
to buy or sell the asset and artificially inflate or deflate prices
and obtain profits.
Spoofing is one of the most popular strategies that uses spoof
orders to improve the price of a given asset and is considered
illegal by market regulators [4]. Pinging is a similar strategy
used by high-frequency traders (HFTs) whereby they place
orders without the intention of execution, but to find liquidity
not fully displayed in the limit order book (LOB)1. It has
caused controversy as it can also be viewed as a manipulative
strategy [5].
In the scientific literature, studies have mainly focused to
develop discriminative methods for detection. There has been
little analysis of the root causes of why traders take manip-
ulative actions, beyond the assumption that they are tempted
by greater profits. However, for this to have any explanatory
power, it is required to examine the interaction between market
dynamics and instruments (e.g., liquidity, transaction taxes,
fees) come together to incentivise this behaviour. Understand-
ing this is crucial if market regulators are to develop counter-
measures to discourage or preclude fraudulent trading.
In this paper, we propose a generative model of spoofing
and pinging in the context of portfolio growth maximisation,
i.e., the expected capital appreciation over time of an invest-
ment account. We use a reinforcement learning agent that
simulates the behaviour of the spoofing trader in the context
of Markov decision processes (MDP) within an environment
where transitions and rewards do not change in time. We also
show that a similar framework can be used to model the
pinging trader with the introduction of partial observability
(reflecting hidden states of the LOB). From this, we are able
to examine the main question of this study, namely: Under
what conditions are spoofing and pinging optimal strategies
compared to honest behaviour while seeking for growth
maximisation? Our results provide a granular analysis of
the incentives to manipulative behaviour, identifying separate
causes such as risk of a manipulative action failing, and the
risk of incurring increased transaction costs. The results can
be viewed as recommendations to market regulators as to how
to discourage market manipulation.
II. RELATED WORK
Research on price manipulation has been done using several
approaches. Some authors have developed analytical mod-
els with the intention to investigate manipulative strategies
1In double auction markets, the limit order book is a listing of all
outstanding buy and sell orders on a given asset, used by traders to make
decide prices at which to place their own buy/sell orders.
under the traditional framework of rational agents trying
to maximise their expected utility [6]–[8]. Other researchers
have applied data driven approaches with the aim to present
empirical evidence of stock price manipulation [9], [10].
Also, behavioural stances have been mixed with theoretical
and data driven approaches to tackle with the problem of
price manipulation as an intentional act [11] and investor
behaviour [11]. Though this approach tries to analyse the
manipulation process from the behavioural perspective, finan-
cial markets by themselves express a global sentiment from
all investors that is ultimately reflected in the prices and an
alternative way to analyse this problem is precisely by studying
the effect of manipulation relative to the incentives present in
the market, just as we propose in this paper.
Furthermore, discriminative models are intended to detect
market manipulation based on empirical data. By using eco-
nomic and statistical analysis it is possible to detect manipu-
lation only after the execution, suggesting that the existence
of regulatory framework may be inefficient [12]. Machine
learning techniques have also been applied for detection of
manipulation. Based on trading data, some authors suggest
that Artificial Neural Networks and Support Vector Machines
are effective techniques to detect manipulation [13]. Others
suggest that a method called “hidden Markov model with
abnormal states” is capable to model and detect price ma-
nipulation patterns, but further analysis is necessary [14]. Data
mining methods for detecting intraday price manipulation have
been used to classify and identify patterns linked to market
manipulation at different time scales, but further research is
needed to address the challenge on detecting the different
forms of manipulation [15]. Furthermore, Naı¨ve Bayes is a
good classifier for predicting potential trades associated to
market manipulation [16]. For the case of spoofing trading,
detection can be done with the implementation of supervised
learning algorithms [17], or can be identified by modelling
trading decisions as MDPs and using Apprenticeship Learning
to learn the reward function [18].
Though research is extensive in the area of market manip-
ulation, few develop generative models of what encourages
these economic agents to follow the disruptive strategies. Fur-
thermore, few of them provide recommendations to regulatory
entities and/or firms [19] to encourage traders to stop this
harmful behaviour. Different to the discriminative models that
are intended to distinguish the manipulative behaviour from
other strategies, we use the (PO)MDP approach to model
spoofing/pinging as it predicts the behaviour of manipulators
in terms of market conditions, thus providing a powerful
tool for analysis of the causes of manipulative strategies, and
suggesting possible remedies for market regulators.
III. BACKGROUND TRADING CONCEPTS
In this section, we provide an account background financial
concepts related to manipulative trading. We start with a
description of the process of trading for portfolio growth
optimisation, before going on to describe market manipulation
through spoofing and pinging.
A. Trading in a Bull Market
We are focused on modelling two trade-based market manipu-
lation strategies as follows. Suppose there is a trader managing
an investment portfolio on behalf of a brokerage firm with
the objective of maximising trading profits through portfolio
growth in the short/medium term. Suppose the agent is trading
in a futures market and the portfolio consists of two different
contracts, α and β, with a market full of optimism so prices
are rising (a situation better known as a bull market).
Mathematically, the capital of the investment account at a
given market tick t ∈ [0, T ] (where a tick represents the
execution of a new trade in the market, either from the trader
or any other participant) can be written as
It = at + ct, (1)
where at = aαt + a
β
t is the capital associated to the market
value of the contracts α and β, and ct is the cash to be
used for future purchases of more contracts. The variable at
changes at every tick since the prices of the contracts are
following the bullish trend, while ct changes due to cash
inflows/outflows (by the sale/purchase of contracts). The net
profit of the investment over a tick window [0, T ] is
R = GT −
T∑
t=0
ζt, (2)
where GT = IT − I0 is the investment growth, and ζt are
the direct transaction costs associated to the trading of the
contracts (such as exchange and government fees).
Under bull market conditions, one way in which the trader can
profit from the portfolio’s growth is with a simple buy and hold
strategy, an almost risk-free strategy whereby she purchases
contracts α and β and simply waits, in the long term, for the
prices to rise before selling for a profit. However, the trader
may, alternatively, be aiming for a higher target growth G∗T in
the short/medium term, requiring a more active strategy than
the “buy and hold”, i.e., buying and selling contracts α and
β, subject to the transaction costs ζt.
For this, the trader can behave in several different ways. First,
the agent may trade honestly, i.e., following all the market
rules, by buying more contracts or selling them when she
believes is profitable. Fig. 1 shows this behaviour with a trader
starting with 1000 contracts and 10 million monetary units
as the account’s net capital value. While the market evolves,
she takes honest actions represented by the filled triangles,
reaching new levels of growth Gt and paying paying the
transaction costs, ζt. Alternatively, the agent may act as a
manipulative trader to control the price of the contracts in
order to accelerate the growth process and quickly reach the
desired level G∗T , just as seen in the non-filed triangles of
Fig. 1.2 In either case, following the transaction, the trader
ends up with a different proportion of the contracts α and
2In our example, the historical prices are not affected by our strategies, but
we use them as a reference on how a manipulative strategy may lead to higher
trading profits when compared to a honest strategy and against the buy and
hold.
β, re-balancing the quantities at and ct and thereby finding
herself in a new level of growth Gt at a given tick t.
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Fig. 1: A simulation of profits gained from different trading
strategies during a bull market period. The data is taken
from the closing prices of the market indexes S&P 500
and NASDAQ Composite to simulate the contracts α and β,
respectively, in the period February 27, 1995 to May 5, 1995.
Note that, the above assumes that the agent can freely tran-
sition between different levels of growth Gt by executing
trades. In reality, this depends on the trades of other market
participants where the buying and selling prices match those
of our agent, allowing the exchange of assets to proceed. The
degree to which such trades can occur is known as market
liquidity, and must also be taken into account in models of
manipulative trading. For example, if liquidity is poor in the
contract to trade, actions taken by the trader can lead to no
change in the level of growth Gt. A manipulator can take
advantage of this situation by placing a large order that may
gain the interest of other market participants and start a process
of price improvement.
B. Price Manipulation by Spoofing
Spoofing is an illegal trading strategy used by traders intended
to manipulate the price of a given asset by placing large orders
(spoofing orders) without the intention of execution, but to give
misleading information to other market participants in terms
of the asset’s supply and demand, thus producing a change in
the price [20]. Once the price is affected, the trader cancels
the spoofing order and places the real order on the opposite
trading side. This real order can be either a limit (priced orders
with fixed volume) or market order (non-priced orders with a
fixed volume that cross the spread, that is, the price difference
between the best buy (or bid) and sell (or ask) quotes listed
in the LOB), but that depends on the spoofer’s risk profile–a
real limit order can be placed but may have the risk of not
being executed, whereas a market order can cross the spread
(thus securing execution) but the profits produced may not be
as high as those gained from limit orders. For our purposes,
we consider our trader only places limit orders and for the
spoofer his real limit order is immediately executed before
the price recovers to the previous level when being affected
by the spoofing order.
C. Price Manipulation by Pinging
Pinging is a strategy implemented by HFTs by exploiting their
speed advantage with the intention to ping the market and
detect the trading pattern of hidden liquidity (orders that are
not fully displayed in the LOB as is the case of large orders
placed by institutional investors), in dark pools (private venues
where the exchange of assets is not visible to the general
public, whose prices depends on the current market prices of
regulated markets), thus finding a potential interest of buying
or selling [21]. In pinging, the HFT is the one that provides
improved prices in her favour as she can sell/buy high/low. As
mentioned in [5, see pp. 613 and references], once the HFT
has detected the presence of a large order in a dark pool, she
takes a small loss at first by eliminating the current liquidity
in a regulated market and then she places new orders (at both,
the established market and the dark pool) at better prices that,
after execution, will produce profits.
IV. TRADING AS A MARKOV DECISION PROCESS
A representation of growth maximisation is
provided in Fig. 2, where we changed the
notation of Gt to st, t ∈ [0, 4], and G∗T to
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Fig. 2:
Idealised
representation
illustrating the
different levels
of st while
maximising
investment
growth.
s∗. There, the four growth levels correspond
to holding a portfolio containing different
proportions of contracts, for example, in s1
the trader holds one contract of type α and
one contract β. If the trader chooses to
buy a second α contract, i.e., action “Buy
α” (↑), she transitions to growth level s2–
holding two α contracts and one β contract
by paying the transaction costs ζ1. Similarly,
if she then chooses to sell the second α
contract, i.e., action “Sell α” (↓), she will
return to growth level s1, now paying ζ2
costs. Additionally, while in s2 taking ac-
tions “Buy α” (↑) and “Sell β” (←), result
in no change in the level of growth. This
is due to orders placed by the trader that were never filled
because the price was too high/low while trying to sell/buy
the β/α contract. For action “Buy β” (→) the trader faces the
problem of poor liquidity in the asset (the obstacle).
A. Spoofing as a Markov Decision Process
In our representation, spoofing is illustrated as follows. Con-
sider the case that, by taking spoofing actions, the trader can
overturn the lack of liquidity in the asset β while in s2. In
Fig. 3, this corresponds to the obstacle switching from the
top centre bin to the bottom centre bin, showing the effect of
manipulation while purchasing more contracts. After taking
action “Manipulative Buy β (⇒)”, the trader obtains profits
and finds herself in s7, closer to s′∗. The two representations
in Fig. 3 have the same levels of growth but with different
conditions associated to market liquidity.
A model that fits the problem of manipulation under the
representation Fig. 1 is that of a Markov Decision Process
(MDP) [18], [22]. In general, an MDP is defined by the
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Fig. 3: Representation illustrating the effect of the spoofing in
the process of investment growth maximisation.
tuple {S,A, T,R}, where S and A are sets of states and
actions, respectively (s ∈ S and a ∈ A), R is the set of
rewards (r ∈ R), and T is a set of transition probabilities
({P (s′|s, a)} ∈ T , where P (s′|s, a) represents the probability
of transitioning to state s′ from s after action a). Actions
are taken according to the policy pi(s, a) that defines the
probability of taking action a in state s.
Considering the growth st as the state variable, the problem
for the trader is to find the best strategy for buying and
selling contracts α and β, subject to the transaction costs
(or rewards in the MDP model) ζt, in order to achieve the
target short/medium term growth s∗. The complete set of
states for spoofing is determined by the state representation
in Fig. 3, while the actions correspond to the process of
buying and selling contracts and are used by the trader to
navigate within the state space. These actions are the honest
ones, A = {↑, ↓,←,→} and similarly the set of manipulative
actions A = {⇑,⇓,⇐,⇒} (“Manipulative Buy α”, “Manip-
ulative Sell α”, “Manipulative Sell β”, “Manipulative Buy
β”, respectively), and the “do nothing” action for the “buy
and hold” A = {◦}, with A = A ∪ A ∪ A. The transition
probabilities are the degree of liquidity the contracts α and β
have at a given tick t; a good degree of liquidity will help
the trader’s orders to be filled and transition to a new level of
growth, while low liquidity will restrict these transitions.
B. Pinging as a Partially Observable MDP
Similar to spoofing, pinging is illustrated in the representation
of Fig. 4 by introducing the concept of observations that
guide the trader on the actions to take. For example, having
observation o2 while in s2 means there is hidden liquidity
(the obstacle) in the sell side of the β contracts, so the HFT
can produce profits by taking control over the prices in the
regulated market while trading in the dark pool against the
hidden liquidity. However, having the same observation in
level s6 means that such liquidity does not exists and taking
the manipulative action may produce losses.
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Fig. 4: Representation that illustrates pinging trading while
trying to maximise the growth of the investment.
Pinging, as described in §III-C, can be modelled
with a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process
(POMDP) [23]. In general, the POMDP is defined by the
tuple {S,A, T,R,O,Ω}, that is, the MDP tuple is extended
with {O,Ω}, where O represents a set of observations
(o ∈ O) and Ω is a set of observation probabilities given
states s and actions r ({O(o|s, r)}). For the POMDP, actions
are taken according to the agent’s belief of being on a given
state and is calculated according to the observations. In our
model, the observations represent the trader’s detection of
hidden liquidity while seeking for profits.
C. Solution
In both models, the trader has the objective to reach the goal
s∗ representing the maximum investment growth and, under
a bull market, the highest profit comes from having the most
contracts (the opposite also applies while in a bear market
[when pessimism persist and prices tend to fall], where the
trader may prefer to sell contracts). We analyse the state
representations in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 as both model a single
agent’s behaviour of acquiring contracts. Other grids with a
more complex structure may also reproduce trading strategies,
but manipulative behaviour may not emerge as an optimal
control according to the simulated market conditions, thus
eliminating the core of the analysis we present in this paper.
Regardless of whether manipulative trading is permitted or
not, the best sequence of trading actions for the agent (op-
timal policy) can be determined in a straightforward manner
through, for example, reinforcement learning. In this paper, for
the MDP model this is achieved through simple value iteration
[24] to find the optimal value function
V pi
∗
(s) = max
a∈A
[
R(s, a) + γ
∑
s′∈S
P (s′|s, a)V (s′)
]
, (3)
where 0 < γ < is the discount factor. The POMDP formalism
is intended to model states not fully observable, explaining
why an observation function is needed to solve the problem.
The observation function, Ω(a, s, o), is the probability of
making observation o from state s after action a [25]. For
POMDP’s the solution is to find optimal policies with actions
that maximises the value function. Based on the agent’s current
beliefs about the state (growth level), this value function can
be represented as a system of simultaneous equations as
V ∗(b) = max
a∈A
[
ρ(b, a) + γ
∑
b′∈B
τ(b, a, b′)V ∗(b′)
]
, (4)
where b ∈ B is a belief state, ρ(b, a) = ∑s∈S b(s)R(s, a)
are the expected rewards for the belief states; τ(b, a, b′) =∑
{o∈O|b=b′} P (o|a, b), the state transition function.
The optimal value function considers the potential rewards
of actions taken in the future, capturing the optimal actions
that generate the most of rewards over the long-term. This
argument enables us to examine the optimal actions in the
(PO)MDP model ultimately determined by two factors: the
reward and the transition functions.
V. EXPERIMENTS
In this section we present the learnt policies from different
experiments for the spoofing and pinging problems explained
above. The purpose of these experiments are i) to demonstrate
whether the manipulative behaviour emerges as an optimal
strategy when both the manipulative and honest agents trade
under the same market conditions, ii) if true, then at which
extent changing the reward function can discourage this be-
haviour or in contrast, iii) changes in the transition dynamics
affects the manipulation process. Points ii) and ii) are meant
to represent market mechanisms that regulators can implement
in order to disincentivise the manipulation process.
The setup of actions and costs in the trading models (ref.
§IV-A and §IV-B) is as follows. All honest actions in direction
of the edge of any of the states have zero costs and make
the agent bounce back to the same state. The same occurs
for manipulative actions, except that the obstacle switches
its position (thus changing from representation). Transitioning
within the different states costs the agent −1 and colliding
against the obstacle has 0/−1 costs for all honest/ manipulative
actions. The terminal states, s∗ and s′∗, have the highest
reward of +1, meaning the trader has reached the desired
growth state. The “do nothing” action (◦) has zero costs in all
states, but the agent is unable to make transitions. Throughout
the below, we set γ = 0.95.
A. Optimal Policy for Spoofing as an MDP
In this section, as a baseline, we first define a market where
honest and manipulative traders pay the same transaction costs,
and all of their actions are deterministic, i.e., the traders are
100% confident about the outcome of their actions. The base-
line is intended to demonstrate whether manipulation naturally
emerges as an optimal strategy to produce investment growth.
We then compare the baseline against the learnt policies once
‘regulators’ apply the proposed counter-measures.
1) Is spoofing and optimal strategy?: Here we investigate
whether spoofing occurs according to the model described
in §IV-A and, if so, what are the factors that encourage
traders to take these actions. As mentioned above, we first
model a market where all participants play under the same
conditions, meaning that all trading actions pay the same
transaction costs and the outcome of their actions being totally
deterministic, i.e., if a trader places a honest limit order then
it is always executed, thus re-balancing the quantities at and
ct and consequently changing the value of (2).
The results of learning in the baseline scenario are shown in
the first column of Table I. For each state, the optimal action is
listed, and in states where multiple actions are equally optimal,
the corresponding arrows are plotted.
As can be seen, spoofing actions are optimal for most of the
states in our example problem. This suggests that, all things
being equal, in our baseline example problem, the choice as
to whether to manipulate the market or not has little impact
on profit maximisation, and therefore comes down to either
symmetry-breaking rules, or the preference of the trader.
TABLE I: Optimal actions for the MDP model under different
conditions of the reward and transition functions.
State Baseline Adding Adding uncertainty on liquidityfines 50% vs. 50% 10% vs. 90%
s1 ↑,→,⇑ → ⇒ ⇒
s2 ⇒ ↓ ⇑,⇐ ↓
s3 →,⇑,⇒ → →,⇒ →,⇒
s4 ↑,⇑ ↑ ↑,⇑ ↑,⇑
s5 ↑,⇑,⇒ ↑ ↑ ↑
s6 → → → ⇒
s7 →,⇒ → →,⇒ →,⇒
s8 ↑,⇑ ↑ ↑,⇑ ↑,⇑
2) Can financial penalties discourage spoofing?: We now
focus our attention to try to discourage spoofing trading by
simulating the introduction of high penalties against spoofers.
These penalties can be viewed as fines or financial penalties as
a warning to traders to stop the misbehaviour, otherwise they
will be forced to pay them if detected. With this information
in hand, we change the reward function by increasing the cost
to all manipulative actions in all states up to −4.53.
In the second column of Table I we show the learnt policy for
the case when financial penalties are introduced. Spoofing, in
contrast to the baseline as explained in §V-A1, is no longer
optimal in any of the states, suggesting that a trader with the
knowledge of implementation of penalties will not take the
risk of follow a disruptive trading strategy to obtain profits.
It is clear that if we reduce (in absolute terms) the proposed
cost for the manipulative actions, then spoofing will eventually
appear once more in the learnt policy, however, this gives us an
idea on the magnitude the introduction of this counter-measure
has to have in order to discourage the manipulation process
by spoofing.
3) Can a controlled liquidity discourage spoofing?: By “con-
trolling the liquidity” we mean that the market mechanisms
must be such that every time a high imbalance is found in
the LOB (produced by the spoofer), then regulators or the
market itself must find the way to quickly counter it and
find a new balance. This will produce uncertainty to spoofing
orders as the price impact will not be the one expected by the
spoofer and consequently the price manipulation process can’t
proceed.
Columns two and three of Table I show the learnt policy after
introducing controls over the liquidity. We used two degrees of
control that produce uncertainty in the liquidity, one where the
obstacle in the representation Fig. 3 has a 50%/50% chance
to switch/stagnate and the second with 10%/90% chances,
respectively. Both represent uncertainty in terms on how the
market reacts to the spoofing order placed by the spoofer. Once
more, spoofing is optimal in most of the states for the two
different degrees of controls even if the price impact is not
the expected one, suggesting that the spoofer can try as many
times as possible until having the desired impact.
B. POMDP Model for Pinging
1) Is pinging an optimal strategy?: We now turn to analyse
the pinging strategy by following the same reasoning as in
spoofing. Again, we use a baseline to demonstrate whether un-
der same conditions of transaction costs and liquidity pinging
traders and honest traders emerge as optimal trading strategies
from the learnt policies.
In the first column in Table 4 we show the learnt policy for
the baseline in the pinging problem. In all observed states,
pinging is optimal even if the hidden liquidity is not found.
We can conclude that this is expected as long as the HFT can
trade against other market participants in the regulated market
without taking extreme risks of executing the ping orders.
TABLE II: Optimal actions for the POMDP model under
different conditions of the reward and transition functions.
Observed Baseline Increase Uncertainty on liquidityState transaction 50% vs. 50% 10% vs. 90%
costs
o1 ⇑ →, ↑ ↑ ↑, ⇒
o2 ⇒, → →, ↓ →, ⇒ →, ⇒, ↓
o3 ⇑ → → →
o4 ⇑ ↑ ↑ ↑
o5 ⇒ → → →
2) Can we discourage pinging by increasing transaction
costs?: As pinging is not illegal, instead of using the same
argument of financial penalisation as it was the case for
spoofing, for pinging we increase the direct transaction costs
in either (or both) of the market venues where the strategy
develops, as a way to discourage HFTs keep implementing the
strategy. Under this scenario, we change the reward function
and set a cost of −4.91 for all manipulative actions in all
states.
The second column of Table II shows the results for this setup
and we see that under the new conditions the learnt policies
reveal pinging is not optimal in any of the observed states as
it was in it’s baseline. The trader can only take honest actions
as pinging is paying large direct transaction costs, thus we can
conjecture that pinging can still produce profits, but not large
enough to cover the direct transaction costs.
3) Can a controlled liquidity discourage pinging?: Finally,
a second attempt to stop pinging trading is by changing the
transition function, just as in the case of spoofing as seen
in §V-A3. Columns three and four in Table II shows once
more the results for these changes and we see that, under
mechanism that provide uncertainty to the effect of pinging
trades over liquidity, pinging is still an optimal action in
some of the observed states, probably because of exceptional
conditions prevailing in such states. This makes us conclude
one more time that a change in the reward function models the
effectiveness to discourage manipulation by pinging, a similar
result as in spoofing trading.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Our results show it is promising the application of the
(PO)MDP frameworks to study a real life problem as the
financial markets. Our models can predict behaviours, and
both the manipulative and honest trading can co-exist in
regulated markets where all participants have the same direct
costs. We found that both spoofing and pinging trading are
optimal investment strategies while traders try to maximise
the investment growth, but market regulators can discourage
the use of these strategies by implementing mechanism over
market liquidity, and this enforcement will be more efficient
if fines are added (for spoofing) or by increasing the direct
transaction costs (pinging).
However, our model works on bull market conditions and we
expect to fit on bear markets if we change the side of the
trading actions. Other conditions where no trends exists may
produce incentives for manipulation as a way to move the
market. Furthermore, in pinging HFTs have the option to avoid
ping orders and analyse the predictability of the asset’s order
flow with the goal to infer the existence of hidden liquidity,
thus saving direct transaction costs.
Further research can be focused on applying the models in real
market data and more complex portfolios, and verify the ef-
fectiveness of the recommendations provided to disincentivise
manipulation performed by spoofing/pinging traders.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Enrique Martı´nez-Miranda acknowledge support from CONA-
CYT (384670) and Beca Complemento SEP, 2014 and 2015
(BC-3465 and BC-4804), Mexico.
REFERENCES
[1] M. O’Hara, Market Microstructure Theory. John Wiley & Sons, 1998.
[2] R. Pardo, The Evaluation and Optimization of Trading Strategies.
Wiley, 2008.
[3] F. Allen and D. Gale, “Stock-price manipulation,” Review of Financial
Studies, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 503–529, 1992.
[4] D. D. Aktas, “Spoofing,” Review of Banking and Financial Law, vol. 33,
no. 89, pp. 89–98, 2013.
[5] G. Scopino, “The (questionable) legality of high-speed “pinging” and
“front running” in the futures market,” Connecticut Law Review, vol. 47,
no. 3, pp. 607–697, February 2015.
[6] R. Jarrow, “Market manipulation, bubbles, corners, and short squeezes,”
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, vol. 27, no. 03, pp.
311–336, 1992.
[7] M. K. Brunnermeier and L. H. Pederse, “Predatory trading,” The Journal
of Finance, vol. 60, no. 4, pp. 1825–1863, 2005.
[8] I. Goldstein and A. Guembel, “Manipulation and the allocational role of
prices,” The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 75, no. 1, pp. 133–164,
January 2008.
[9] A. I. Khwaja and A. Mian, “Unchecked intermediaries: Price manipu-
lation in an emerging stock market,” Journal of Financial Economics,
vol. 78, no. 1, pp. 203–241, October 2005.
[10] P. Hillion and M. Suominen, “The manipulation of closing prices,”
Journal of Financial Markets, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 351–375, 2004.
[11] S. D. Ledgerwood and P. R. Carpenter, “A framework for the analysis
of market manipulation,” Review of Law & Economics, vol. 8, no. 1,
pp. 253–295, 2012.
[12] C. Pirrong, “Detecting Manipulation in Futures Markets: The Ferruzzi
Soybean Episode,” American Law and Economics Review, vol. 6, no. 1,
pp. 28–71, 2004.
[13] H. O¨gˇu¨t, M. M. Dogˇanay, and R. Aktas¸, “Detecting stock-price manip-
ulation in an emerging market: The case of turkey,” Expert Systems with
Applications, vol. 36, no. 9, pp. 11 944 – 11 949, 2009.
[14] Y. Cao, Y. Li, S. Coleman, A. Belatreche, and T. M. McGinnity, “A
Hidden Markov Model with abnormal states for detecting stock price
manipulation,” in Systems, Man, and Cybernetics (SMC), 2013 IEEE
International Conference on, Oct 2013, pp. 3014–3019.
[15] D. Dı´az-Solı´s, B. Theodoulidis, and P. Sampaio, “Analysis of stock
market manipulations using knowledge discovery techniques applied to
intraday trade prices,” Expert Systems with Applications, vol. 38, no. 10,
2011.
[16] K. Golmohammadi, O. Zaiane, and D. R. Dı´az, “Detecting stock market
manipulation using supervised learning algorithms,” in Data Science and
Advanced Analytics (DSAA), 2014 International Conference on. IEEE,
2014, pp. 435–441.
[17] Y. Cao, Y. Li, S. Coleman, A. Belatreche, and T. M. McGinnity,
“Detecting price manipulation in the financial market,” in Computational
Intelligence for Financial Engineering Economics (CIFEr), 2104 IEEE
Conference on, 2014, pp. 77–84.
[18] S. Yang, M. Paddrik, R. Hayes, A. Todd, A. Kirilenko, P. Beling, and
W. Scherer, “Behavior based learning in identifying high frequency trad-
ing strategies,” in Computational Intelligence for Financial Engineering
& Economics (CIFEr), 2012 IEEE Conference on. IEEE, 2012, pp.
1–8.
[19] M. Rossi, G. Deis, J. Roche, and K. Przywara, “Recent civil and
criminal enforcement action involving high frequency trading,” Journal
of Investment Compliance, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 5–12, 2015.
[20] E. J. Lee, K. S. Eom, and K. S. Park, “Microstructure-based manipula-
tion: Strategic behavior and performance of spoofing traders,” Journal
of Financial Markets, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 227–252, 2013.
[21] J. Xu, “Optimal strategies of high frequency traders,” Available at SSRN
2382378, 2013.
[22] Y. Nevmyvaka, Y. Feng, and M. Kearns, “Reinforcement learning for
optimized trade execution,” in Proceedings of the 23rd international
conference on Machine learning. ACM, 2006, pp. 673–680.
[23] A. C. E. Baffa and A. E. M. Ciarlini, “Modeling POMDPs for generating
and simulating stock investment policies,” in Proceedings of the 2010
ACM Symposium on Applied Computing. ACM, 2010, pp. 2394–2399.
[24] R. S. Sutton and A. G. Barto, Introduction to Reinforcement Learning,
1st ed. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press, 1998.
[25] L. P. Kaelbling, M. L. Littman, and A. R. Cassandra, “Planning and
acting in partially observable stochastic domains,” Artificial intelligence,
vol. 101, no. 1, pp. 99–134, 1998.
